Military Line



Upholding, defending, and applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, principally Maoism, Chairman Gonzalo has established the military line of the Party. In the First Expanded National Conference of November, 1979, it was agreed upon as being central to the general political line and it is now being developed through the People’s War.

Chairman Gonzalo has persistently integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism with the concrete practice of the Peruvian revolution, combating and crushing revisionism and the right opportunist lines. In applying dialectical materialism to the question of war, the military line also expresses the philosophical thought of Chairman Gonzalo and summarizes the laws of war, of revolutionary war in general, and the specific laws of the revolutionary war in Peru. The military line is vital to our ideological, political, military, economic, and cultural work and permits us to differentiate between the proletarian military line and the bourgeois military line.

The military line consists of the laws that govern the People’s War for the conquest of Power and its defense. It contains three elements: 1) People’s war, specified in our case as unified people’s war, with the countryside as principal and the city complementary. 2) Construction of the revolutionary armed forces, in our case specified as the People’s Guerilla Army, which has the particularity of incorporating the militia in order to advance towards the sea of armed masses, and; 3) Strategy and tactics that are formed through the encirclement and annihilation campaigns and the counter-campaigns of encirclement and annihilation. In our case this is specified by applying political and military plans that have a political and military strategy developed in campaigns with specific objectives.



Chairman Gonzalo, reaffirming himself on the universal law of revolutionary violence, takes up the highest military theory of the proletariat established by Chairman Mao: People’s war, which is universally validity and is applicable in all types of countries, in accordance with the conditions of each revolution. The world people’s war is the principal form of struggle that the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the world should launch to oppose imperialist world war. His point of departure is that people’s war is a war of the masses and can only be accomplished by mobilizing the masses and relying on them. He says: “The masses give us everything, from the crusts of bread that are taken from their own mouths to their precious blood which stirs jointly with that of the combatants and militants, which nourishes the road of the People’s War for the New Power.” The masses should be organized with asrms into the People’s Guerilla Army. In the rural Support Bases all the men and women of each People’s Committee are organized militarily. In the cities, the People’s Guerrilla Army also acts and accretes more and more of the masses into the various new organizations in and for the People’s War. The Revolutionary Movement in Defense of the People is the concretization of the Front in the cities, and its objective is to mobilize the masses in resistance, to serve the war, and to serve the future insurrection.

He holds that in order to carry forward the People’s War we must take into account four fundamental questions: 1) The ideology of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism that must be specified in a guiding thought—therefore we base ourselves on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought, primarily the latter; 2) The need for the Communist Party of Peru that leads the People’s War; 3) The People’s War is specified as a peasant war that follows the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside; and 4) Support Bases or the New Power, the construction of the Support Bases, which is the essence of the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside.

He analyzes the historical process of our people and demonstrates that they have always struggled, that it “has been cradled and advanced through revolutionary violence. It is through this violence, in its diverse forms and degrees, that our people have conquered their revindications, rights, and freedoms, since nothing fell from the sky, nor was it handed out. ‘Damn the words of traitors’; everything was won in fact through revolutionary violence, in ardent battles against reactionary violence; that is how the eight hour day was won, how our lands were conquered and defended, how our rights were won and tyrants were overthrown. Revolutionary violence is, therefore, the very essence of our historical process… it is easy to understand that the development and victory of the Peruvian revolution, of our democratic revolution, the emancipation of the people and the class, will be achieved solely through the greatest revolutionary war of our people, raising the masses in arms through the People’s War”.

He draws the historical lesson that these political and military events have defined the major transformations in the country. He tells us that first comes the military deed and later political change. Thus he reaffirms that war is the continuation of politics by other means. He teaches us how the masses of our people have fought against the exploiters. Since the VII century, in which the Peruvian state emerged, the masses have combated oppression and exploitation. The Incan empire established its domination through wars of conquest which culminated in the battle of Yahuarpampa against the Chancas(1). Later, the empire further expanded through wars. This is a political and military fact.

The conquest by the Spanish crown was another political and military event that was imposed, crushing the resistance of the indigenous people and using the internal struggles of the conquered. Nevertheless, we should highlight among others the struggle of Manco Inca, who led a rebellion against the Spanish.

The imposition of the Vice-royalty was another political and military event that was used to crush the conquistadors themselves. To maintain itself it had to face large peasant uprisings such as the one led by Juan Santos Atahualpa, and in 1780 the powerful movement of Túpac Amaru that raised 100 thousand men, extending from Cusco and Puno into Bolivia, putting the domination of the Vice-royalty at serious risk, having repercussions in Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico and that shook up America. The movement was defeated, but it had shaken up and undermined the Vice-royalty, thus preparing the conditions for Emancipation. To see its class character, we should recall that Túpac Amaru was a cacique.(2)

The Emancipation was another military and political event and has three moments: First, in the XVIII Century, peasant uprisings, Túpac Amaru for example; second, the uprisings in the cities, such as that of Francisco de Zela in Tacna and the guerrillas, highlighting those of Cangallo and Yauyos among many others; third, confrontations between large armies that complete the liberating exploits of San Martín and Bolivar in the battle of Ayacucho in 1824. It is important to understand that even though the Emancipation was led by the creoles, it had the merit of breaking the domination of the Spanish crown; that San Martín was a great military strategist and Bolivar proved to be both a political and military strategist. Both of them fought for the emancipation of several American countries without seeking personal gain, showing that to serve a great cause we must always put the general interest first and never the personal, and they did so without being Communists.

In the Republic the landlords remained in power but confronting the great peasant struggles with fire and blood, among them those of Atusparia and Uscho Pedro, or that of Llaccolla(3) in Ocros. Here we have the dark chapter of the war with Chile where both countries faced each other manipulated by the interests of the English and the French that were seeking our wealth in guano and nitrates. This was a war that halted the incipient capitalist development of the country and revealed the dirty role of the dominant classes, part of which capitulated to Chile. But we must emphasize the heroic resistance of the masses against the invader in defense of the people and territorial integrity, a resistance that was especially strong in the mountainous Central and Southern regions of the country where guerrillas were formed; Cáceres(4), who was a landowner-soldier, played an important role in that circumstance.

The war with Chile was waged from 1879 to 1883, and it led to the collapse of the Peruvian economy. Shortly thereafter, in 1895 it entered the beginning of bureaucratic capitalism that initiated the development of contemporary Peruvian society. As the XIX Century passed, Peru went from being a colony to a semi-colony and from feudal to semi-feudal. Bureaucratic capitalism bound to Yankee imperialism began to develop, and thus displaced the English. The modern proletariat emerged which changed the terms of the political struggle.

From this historical process the following lessons are drawn: That the people have always struggled, they are not peaceful and they apply revolutionary violence with the means they have at hand; that the peasant struggles are those which have most shaken the foundations of society, and these struggles have not triumphed because they lacked the leadership of the proletariat represented by the Communist Party; and that political and military events determine the major social changes.

From the standpoint of the military line, contemporary Peru has three moments linked to the appearance of the proletariat that founds its Party to take Power through revolutionary violence, specifying its road, which is synthesized in the process of the military line of the Party.

The first moment (1895 to 1945). The Communist Party of Peru is constituted and regarding the military line, Mariátegui establishes the “Indication and outline of the road.” The heroic workers’ struggles for better wages, the eight hour work day, for decent working conditions, the peasant movements of the southern Sierra for lands and the agricultural proletarian movements, and the movements to reform the university, leads to a complex sharpening of the class struggle in which the Peruvian proletariat matures and in which Mariátegui founds the Communist Party of Peru, on October 7, 1928, under the banner of Marxism-Leninism.

Mariátegui indicated and outlined fundamental ideas on revolutionary violence. He said: “There is no revolution that is moderate, balanced, calm, placid.” “Power is conquered through violence… it is preserved only through dictatorship.” He conceived war as being protracted in nature: “A revolution can only be fulfilled after many years. Frequently it has alternating periods of predominance by the revolutionary forces or by the counterrevolutionary forces.” He established the relationship between politics and war, understanding that the revolution generates an army of a new type with its own tasks different from those of the exploiters; he also understood the role of the peasantry and the vital participation of the working class in a leading role, that the revolution will come from the Andes, that “with the defeat of the latifundista feudalism, urban capitalism will lack forces to resist the growing working class”; that in order to make revolution rifles, a program and doctrine are needed. He conceived the revolution as a total war in which there is a conjunction of political, social, military, economic and moral elements, and that each faction puts in tension and mobilizes all the resources that it can. He totally rejected the electoral road.

With the death of Mariátegui in April 1930, the Right led by Ravines is going to usurp the leadership of the Party and the questioning and negation of Mariátegui’s road occurs. They invoke insurrection in words but degenerate into electoralism. The so-called “Constitutional Congress” of the Party in 1942 sanctions the capitulationist tactics of of the “National Union”, both in internal politics as well as internationally. The Party is influenced by Browderite ideas, a predecessor of modern revisionism, where there is a clear abandonment of revolutionary violence and an electoral tactic is promoted centering on the “National Democratic Front”. Nevertheless, the red line in the Party struggled to defend the Marxist-Leninist positions, although it was bitterly combated and the internal struggles were resolved through expulsions.

The second moment (1945 to 1980). The Communist Party of Peru is reconstituted, and with respect to the military line, Chairman Gonzalo establishes the “Definition and Foundations of the Road”. This second moment has two parts: The first, in the period from 1945 to 1963, is one of “New impulses for the development of the Party and the beginnings of the struggle against revisionism” and the second, from 1963 to 1980, is one of “Establishment of the general political line and reconstitution of the Party”.

In the first part of the second moment, by the mid-1950s, the struggle begins for reactivating the Party that had been left in disarray after Odría’s coup d’état. Afterwards, the Party commences the opening step in the struggle against revisionism. This process occurs in the midst of the repercussions of the Cuban revolution and principally because the unfolding of the struggle between Marxism and revisionism begins at the world level. The road to revolution begins to be discussed, the armed struggle is talked about again and in the IV Congress of the Party in 1962, it is agreed that in Peru the so-called “two roads” are viable: “The peaceful road and the violent one.” Also, “the revolution can follow the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside as well as from the city to the countryside.” But in spite of this empty talk, the Party in essence was hanging on to the old electoral strategy then taking the form of the so-called “National Liberation Front.” This was the revisionism of Khrushchev. At this time the political positions of Chairman Gonzalo begin to emerge, who laid the foundations of the red line which adhered to the positions of Chairman Mao in the struggle between Marxism and revisionism.

In the second part of the second moment, from 1963 to 1980, we have the “Establishment of the general political line and reconstitution of the Party”, this task was carried forward by Chairman Gonzalo in constituting the red fraction of the Party in an intense struggle of more than fifteen years and through three political strategies:

From 1963 to 1969 he guided the red fraction under the political strategy of following the “Road of surrounding the cities from the countryside.” From 1969 to 1976 he led the Party with the political strategy of “Reconstitution of the Party for people’s war.” From 1976 to 1979 there was the political strategy of “Complete the Reconstitution and Establish Foundations” for the beginning of the armed struggle.

During the first strategic period of following the “Road of surrounding the cities from the countryside,” the Communists of Peru are profoundly stirred by the struggle between Marxism and revisionism, and Marxist positions soak into the organization. In the 1960s there is a great peasant movement that mobilized 300 to 500 thousand peasants which fought for land but that did not convert into an armed struggle due to revisionist leadership; a great movement of labor strikes occurs in the working class, and the university struggle is developed to a higher level. All these events had repercussions on the Party and Chairman Gonzalo would forge the red fraction in Ayacucho, with clear ideas that the Party must seize power, and that it must be based on Marxist theory. He unleashes a frontal struggle against revisionism that was centered in the Soviet Union, and adheres firmly to the positions of the Chinese Communist Party and principally with those of Chairman Mao. He expounds that: “The countryside is in a powerful revolutionary ferment”, “we must pay special attention to the countryside and to the poor peasants”, and that “our revolution will be from the countryside to the city”. In the IV National Conference of January 1964, he meets with the different bases of the Party to expel revisionism and its crusty representatives Jorge del Prado, Acosta and Juan Barrio. Thus our Party is going to be one of the first in breaking and expelling revisionism from its ranks.

Chairman Gonzalo began to consolidate [aboco a parar] the Party in the Regional Committee of Ayacucho; he put the center of Party work in the countryside; in the city he organized the poor masses in the Neighborhoods’ Federation, and reorganized the Revolutionary Student Front. But what is of transcendental importance is that despite the opposition of the new central leadership Chairman Gonzalo, by applying a Party agreement, launched the “Special Work”, which was the military work of the Regional Committees by giving them three functions: political, military, and logistical. Afterwards, in sharp two-line struggle against the positions of the central leadership that wanted to control the military work, he combated militarism, mercenaryism and foquismo. [This refers to the foco theory of Che Guerara—Trans.] In these circumstances the guerrillas of the MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left—Trans.] develop, a position that expressed the struggle of our people from a petit-bourgeois outlook, which follows a militaristic line and sidesteps the Party. In spite of being out of step with the rise of the peasants, this movement showed the feasibility of armed struggle as a perspective, provided that it be led by a just and correct line under the leadership of the Party. For that reason, Chairman Gonzalo was opposed to dissolving the Party in order to tail the MIR and the ELN [National Liberation Army—Trans.] in a supposed Front. At the September 1967 meeting of the Expanded Political Bureau, he expounded a Strategic Plan which contained a set of measures that the Central Committee should take for the construction of the three instruments, having as its principal task the forming of the armed forces that was agreed upon at the V National Conference of 1965. This occurs in the midst of a factional struggle where most notably the fractions of “Patria Roja” and the Right liquidationism of Paredes contend to corner the leadership of the Party. Paredes intended to replay the tactic of tailing a faction of the big bourgeoisie, while those of “Patria Roja” went on to plunge into Right opportunism.

During the second political strategy of “Reconstitute the Party for Peoples War,” Chairman Gonzalo will expound on the underlying revisionism within the Party and that it is necessary to reconstitute it on the Basis of Party Unity: Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought, the thought of Mariátegui and the general political line. These positions were fought against by the aforementioned fractions. The mishandling of the two-line struggle by Paredes is going to lead to the fragmentation of the Party. Chairman Gonzalo understood the necessity of the reconstitution of the Party and the necessity to unleash an internal struggle to make it a reality by sweeping away revisionism, as evidenced by the editorials he wrote in Bandera Roja of December 1967, “Develop the Internal Struggle in Depth,” and of April 1968, “Deepen and Intensify the Internal Struggle in Revolutionary Practice.” He will work tirelessly for the channeling of revolutionary violence into people’s war, for the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside, thus accomplishing the principal task demanded by the Party: The construction of the revolutionary armed forces. He expounds that the indispensable foundation in this undertaking is the development of revolutionary peasant work, that without good work among the peasant masses, that is, work guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought and led by the Communist Party, there cannot be a development of the armed forces nor of the People’s War. Afterward, he says that we must not only retake the continuing validity of Mariátegui’s thought, but we must also develop it. He establishes the Agrarian Program of the Party in May of 1969. In 1972 he establishes the Strategic Plan of the Regional Committee of Ayacucho. He defeats the Right liquidationism, and in the Party two fractions remain: The red fraction fundamentally in Ayacucho, led by Chairman Gonzalo, and the “Bolshevik” fraction, acting primarily in Lima. The so-called “bolsheviks” developed a Left liquidationist line, a form of revisionism that isolated the Party from the masses. Their conception was that it was impossible to fight under fascism, that having a correct line was enough. They had a military line that was opposed to people’s war. They were crushed in 1975 and their leaders fled.

During the third political strategy to “Complete the Reconstitution and to Establish Bases” to initiate the armed struggle, the problem was to finish, to consider the Reconstitution of the Party as complete, and to establish foundations to begin the armed struggle. This issue will be defined in the VII Plenum of April, 1977, in which all the Party worked under the slogan of “Construction serving the armed struggle”, in struggle against the seeds of a right opportunist line, which sustained that Velasco had carried out the agrarian reform, that there was a need to organize the peasants around the Peasant Federation of Peru and that people’s war needed to be waged for the “most deeply felt [mas sentidas] revindications of the masses”, forgetting about the problems of land and of Power. In the cities, they developed “workerism”, focusing the class in labor leaders [gremialismo] and opposed to the class playing its leading role. Once these positions were crushed, Chairman Gonzalo launched the “National Plan of Construction” in June of 1977; dozens of cadre were sent to the countryside in the interests of the strategic needs of the People’s War and to build Regional Committees taking into account the future Support Bases. In the VIII Plenum of July of 1978, he establishes the “Outline for the Armed Struggle”. In essence, he expounded that the People’s War in Peru must be developed as a unified whole in both the countryside as well as in the city, with the countryside being the principal theater of armed actions, following the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside. Furthermore, it must take into account the historical social process of the country, especially the military aspect, the importance of the Sierra and principally from the Central and Southern part in our history, the importance of the Capital, and the need to place Peru within the context of Latin America, in South America particularly, and within the international context and the world revolution. All the Party entered into a general reorganization, placing the countryside as central to develop the principal form of struggle and organization. Thus, the basis of the construction of the three instruments of the revolution was laid down.

In synthesis, the entire process of Reconstitution left us with a Party of a new type prepared to initiate the People’s War and to lead it until the conquest of power countrywide. In this process the historic contingent was forged, who with the ideology of the proletariat under the leadership of Chairman Gonzalo was ready to assume the conquest of Power through the People’s War.

The third moment (1980 to the present). The Party begins to lead the People’s War. Its military line is formed with the “Application and development of the Road.” This third moment has four milestones: 1) Definition; 2) Preparation; 3) Initiation; and 4) Development of the guerrilla war.

1) Definition. In essence, the Party takes the historic and transcendental agreement of initiating the People’s War in Peru, which was defined in the IX Expanded Plenum of June, 1979. This agreement was achieved in the midst of three intense struggles: The first was against the right opportunist line that was opposed to initiating the armed struggle, negating the revolutionary situation, that the conditions didn’t exist, and that there was “stability.” They were expelled, and the Party agreed upon a new stage and a new goal. The second struggle was against a new Rightist line that considered that initiating the armed struggle was impossible, that it was a “dream”, that there was no need of taking up that agreement because it was a matter of principle. The third struggle was with the divergences within the Left, one in which the nuances were discussed on how to develop the People’s War. It was established that the proletarian position was Chairman Gonzalo’s and therefore was the one which should be enforced; the entire Party made a commitment to be guided by the leadership of Chairman Gonzalo.

Concerning the construction of the armed forces, measures were taken to form military cadres, specific groups for action and to undermine the reactionary forces, aiming at soldiers. In strategy and tactics, the organic system was re-proposed.

2) Preparation. In this milestone event, the Program of the Party is sanctioned, along with the general political line of the Peruvian revolution and the Party statues. Problems of political strategy related to revolutionary violence, the People’s War and the Party, the Army and United Front are resolved. The following Decision is assumed: “Forge the First Company in Deeds! Let violence flourish realized in the initiation and development of the armed struggle; we open with lead and offer our blood to write the new chapter of the history of the Party and of our people forging the First Company in deeds (Peru, December 3, 1979).”

The Party prepared the armed struggle dealing with two problems: 1) Problems of Political Strategy that define both the content and the objectives of the People’s War in perspective and in the short term, as well as the guidelines that the People’s War should have, its military plans, the construction of the three instruments and their connection with the new Power; 2) The Initiation of the armed struggle. This decisive and paramount question had merited the most special attention from Chairman Gonzalo, who established the “Plan of Initiation” guided by the slogan “Initiate the armed struggle!” that was the condensation of the principal politics that had to be developed militarily. Its contents included: First, the political tasks to be fulfilled which are initiating the armed struggle, boycotting the elections, militarily promoting the armed struggle for the land and establishing the bases for the new conquests, especially the new Power. Second, forms of struggle: Guerrilla warfare, sabotage, propaganda and armed agitation, and selective annihilation. Third, organic and military forms: Armed detachments, with or without modern weapons. Fourth, a chronology, date of the initiation and duration of the Plan, and simultaneous actions for specific dates. Fifth, slogans: “Armed Struggle!”, “A Workers’ and Peasants’ Government!”, and “Down with the New Reactionary Government!”

The Preparation was carried out in struggle against the Rightist positions within the Party that were negating conditions, that the Party was not prepared or that the masses would not lend us support. The leader of these positions deserted and they were crushed.

3) Initiation. On May 17, 1980, the People’s War in Peru began. It “was a defiant political blow of transcendental significance, deploying rebellious red flags and hoisting hammers and sickles, that proclaimed: ‘It is right to rebel’ and ‘Power grows from the barrel of a gun.’ It summoned the people, especially the poor peasantry, to stand up in arms, to light the bonfire and to shake the Andes, to write the new history in the fields and hidden features of our tumultuous landscape, to tear down the rotten walls of the oppressive order, to conquer the summits, to storm the heavens with guns to open the new dawn. The beginnings were modest, almost without modern weapons. Combat was given, it was advanced and it was built from the small to the large and from the weak material and initial fire came the great turbulent fire and mighty roar that grows, sowing revolution and exploding into ever more impetuous People’s War.”

This third milestone lasted from May to December of 1980, resolving the problem of how to initiate the armed struggle, of crossing from the times of peace to the times of war. The militarization of the Party through actions and the masterful Plan of Initiation were key. This was how the new was born: The principal form of struggle, the armed struggle and the principal form of organization, the detachments and squads. The most outstanding actions in the field were the guerrilla actions of Ayrabamba and Aysarca [localities in Ayacucho—Trans.] and, in the city, setting fire to the Municipal Building of San Martín [a district in Lima—Trans.]. The boycott of the elections in the town of Chuschi was the action that initiated the beginning of the People’s War. This plan was fulfilled, defeating the Rightist positions that were saying that the Plan was “Hoxhite” and that the actions were centered in the city. These arguments exaggerated appearances with reality and distorted their essence, since reactionary propaganda gave big headlines to the sabotages in the cities and minimized the actions in the countryside. It is a specificity of the People’s War in Peru to make the countryside the principal theater of action and the cities a necessary complement.

4) Development of the guerrilla war. It has been fulfilled through three military plans: Deploy guerrilla warfare, Conquer Bases and Develop Bases.

Regarding the Deployment of guerrilla warfare. This was completed by a plan that lasted from May 1981 to December 1982 and had a pilot period in January 1981. The slogan “Open guerrilla zones in function of Support Bases” implied an ideological-political leap by putting Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, guiding thought of Chairman Gonzalo as the basis of party unity. Militarily, guerrilla warfare opened like a fan throughout the country seeking to “Capture weapons and the means for war, shake up the countryside with armed actions” and “Strike to advance towards the Support Bases.” These plans were partially completed with the latter, “Strike “, being the link with the subsequent plan. The razing of feudal production relations, aiming against gamonalismo as the spearhead, and fighting against the joint police operations was advanced. A multitude of assaults on police posts and selective annihilation against gamonal power were carried out, generating a great mass mobilization of peasant masses that incorporated themselves into the militia, giving rise to a power vacuum for the reactionaries. The People’s Committees emerged, which grew and multiplied. This is how the Support Bases appeared and were specified.

We emphasize actions such as the assault on the city jail of Ayacucho where the First Company acted for the first time, harassing the city and freeing tens of prisoners of war; the assaults on the police posts of Vilcashuamán, of Totos, of San José de Secce; the sabotages to the power grid and communication lines; the razings like those of Pincos, Toxama, Allpachaca, Huayllapampa among others. In the cities there were the sabotages to bureaucratic capitalism and to imperialism, as well as support for strikes by armed actions.

Here the Rightist positions that were combated were those of personal power and fiefdoms and the retreats in actions. Deploying the guerrilla war gave us the most important conquest: The new Power, the clandestine People’s Committees that are the backbone of the Support Bases.

Facing the advance of the People’s War, the reactionary government of Belaúnde from the very beginning launched the persecution, repression, torture, the imprisonment and death of the militants, combatants and the masses. They have mounted police operations independently and jointly with their police forces, Civil Guards, Republican Guards, Investigative Police, along with the counterinsurgency corps known as the “sinchis“. They promulgated the D.L. [Legal Decree—Trans.] No. 046, a truly terrorist law that violates the most elementary principles of bourgeois criminal law. But the result of all their plans has been the most all-round failure; the masses rejected and resisted their aggression. The emergence of the new Power broke the reticence of the Belaúnde government, which from the beginning minimized the problem to maintain their bogus democratic facade and strengthened the class necessities of the two exploiters, the big bourgeoisie and landlords under the protection of principally Yankee imperialism. Belaunde then entrusted the armed forces (Army, Navy and Air Force), the backbone of the State, to reestablish public order with the support of the police forces, imposing a state of emergency under political-military control in the regions of Ayacucho, Apurímac and Huancavelica, from December of 1982 until today.

Chairman Gonzalo, with the development of the People’s War and the counterrevolutionary response that implied a qualitative leap, outlined the Great Plan of Conquering Bases in the Expanded Central Committee from January to March 1983 where four political tasks were defined: The general reorganization of the Party, the creation of the People’s Guerrilla Army and the Revolutionary Defense Front of the People and their concretization as People’s Committees in the countryside and as the Revolutionary Defense Movement of the People in the cities and the Military Plan of Conquering Bases. Politically, the contradiction new State—old State was making headway under the slogan of “Defend, Develop and Build” the Support Bases. A sharp armed conflict developed in which the reactionaries struggled to reestablish the old Power and the revolution struggled to counter-reestablish the new Power. This is what we call the struggle between reestablishment and counter-reestablishment encompassing the years 1983 and 1984. Military plans were specified for the zones applying the tactics of encircling and striking the enemy’s weak point. Two successful campaigns were completed in which the new Power was tempered passing its first test of fire; the Party was steeled and the People’s Guerrilla Army was developed.

The reactionary armed forces pursued the counterrevolutionary war following the concepts of their Yankee imperialist master, the theory of counterrevolutionary war based on their experience in Vietnam and particularly drawn from the combat against the armed struggle in Latin America, especially in Central America. That is the basic theoretical source combined with the “anti-terrorist” experience of Israel and its counterpart in Argentina, along with advisors from the Federal Republic of Germany, Taiwan, Spain, etc. This combined with their experience of the few months of anti-guerrilla struggle of 1965 and the more limited experience of fighting in La Convención. The operations are under the direction of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces that acts according to the will of the National Defense Council headed by the President, today under Alan García, who holds direct and inescapable responsibility. This counterrevolutionary strategy has been defeated many times. It has been crushed and defeated completely and thoroughly by people’s war, showing to the world again and again the superiority of the strategy of the proletariat over that of imperialism.

Specific policies that were applied by the genocidal government: masses against masses; genocide, mass graves; disappearances of entire villages. In synthesis, they unleashed the white terror in the countryside, especially in Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurímac. The result of this genocide is eight thousand seven hundred Peruvians dead. Of these, four thousand seven hundred of the murdered were the poorest and the most exploited, mainly peasants, shanty-town and slumdwellers of the cities, along with four thousand disappeared. This genocide has not produced the result they wanted; it did not crush the People’s War. On the contrary, “the People’s War grows stronger, developing and striking powerful blows,” proving what Chairman Mao taught, that repression is what incites the revolution.

Within the Plan of Conquering Bases is the “Plan of the Great Leap” that is subject to the specific political strategy of “Two Republics are expressed, two roads, twopoles” and the military strategy of “generalize the guerrilla warfare.” Four successful campaigns were carried out under the political guidelines of: “Open our political space”, “Against the general elections of 1985, disrupt, destabilize and impede them wherever feasible”, “Against the ascension to power by the new Aprista government,” and “Undermine the fascist and corporative Aprista assembly.” The People’s War developed in the region of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac and was expanded to Pasco, Huánuco and San Martín, covering an area from the department of Cajamarca, on the border with Ecuador in the Northwest, to Puno on the border with Bolivia in the Southeast of the country, striking and shaking-up the cities, especially in the capital. The People’s War fundamentally occurs in the Sierra, the historical axis of Peruvian society and its most backward and poorest part, by transforming it into the grand theater of the revolutionary war. It advanced to the edge of the Jungle and to the headlands of the Coast. Thus, the People’s War was not conceived in a single region but was developed simultaneously in several regions, although in unequal form, with a principal area that can vary as necessary. All this is within a strategically centralized and a tactically decentralized plan.

Among the most salient actions, we can see the blows against the anti-guerrilla bases in the department of Ayacucho; the destruction of the counter-subversive settlements [nucleamientos]; disruptions in the establishment of the local micro-regions; in Huancavelica the demolition of the electrical grid and the destruction of the highway system; the destruction of the agricultural cooperatives Cinto and Vichincha with cattle redistribution and appropriation of lands; breakthroughs in Apurímac. In the Central region, there were ambushes such as in Michivilca, sabotage to the substation of Centromín [state mining corporation—Trans.], sabotage to SAIS [state-run cooperative—Trans.] Túpac Amaru. In the North, land seizures under the slogan “Seize the Land!” that mobilized 160 thousand peasants and confiscated 320 thousand hectares, mostly pastures, and 12 thousand head of livestock [reses]; sabotage to the oil pipeline “Norperuano”, and to the headquarters of APRA in the city of Trujillo. In the South, the land question was shaken up by the mobilization of more than 10 thousand peasants; in Huallaga, an assault on the police post of Aucayacu, destruction of the large [tealera] company, and the ambush of the Republican Guards; in Metropolitan Lima, sabotages against the embassy of Russian social-imperialists, against dozens of local offices of the APRA party, and against banks and factories, all leading to a state of emergency and [toque de queda] of the Capital under the responsibility of the Armed Forces in February of 1986.

Alan García Pérez has continued the counterrevolutionary politics of his predecessor and sought to crush the People’s War through genocides such as those of Accomarca, Llocllapampa, Umaru and Bellavista in the countryside. In the capital of the Republic, he has unleashed two genocides against the prisoners of war, the first on the 4th of October, 1985, where 30 militants and combatants were annihilated in the shining trench of combat of Lurigancho. That did not break the heroic resistance of the prisoners of war who, with their blood, formed the Day of the Prisoner of War. The second was on June 19 1986, where the most vile and despicable premeditated crime was committed with perfidy to crush the People’s War and to annihilate the prisoners of war, who with a ferocious resistance inflicted the most serious political, military, and moral defeat to the genocidal Aprista government. This highlighted and defined their dilemma of serving the bureaucratic faction of the big bourgeoisie, in order to develop fascism and corporativism, leaving García and the Aprista party forever bathed in the blood of the genocide. Thus the Day of Heroism was formed with the monumental trilogy of 250 dead in the shining trenches of combat of El Fronton, Lurigancho, and Callao.

We condemn and unmask opportunism and revisionism in its various incarnations: The pro-Russian, the pro-Chinese, the false Mariateguists, all those who have acted and continue to act as informers, tailing after the counterrevolution, negating and combating the People’s War and branding it as terrorism, repeating what Reagan, the Peruvian and world reactionaries say. Unable to prove their charges they simply hurl adjectives and condemn violence “whatever the source,” and continue with their old electoral positions with the aim of pigeonholing the people with parliamentary cretinism, sinking further each day into that lifeguard of the old order, their rotten parliament, their electoral farces, their constitution and their laws, living in quivering fear and reverential dread before the reactionary armed forces and the coup d’etat. We condemn the groveling attitude and capitulation of Barrantes Lingán and his stooges and cronies.

Since 1983, the political strategy of the Great Plan of Conquering Bases was completed through two campaigns of defending, developing and building Parts I and II, and the Plan for the Great Leap with its four campaigns up to December 1986, show us the advance of the People’s War, that we are solidly linked to the masses, contrary to everything they say, since the facts belie them irrefutably. The People’s War has conquered an area that extends itself through the Sierra, the Jungle and the Coast, marching vigorously and strong, building the new and opening what is to be. The Support Bases which are the core of the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside have already been conquered.

Regarding the Great Plan of Developing Bases. This has a special position in the People’s War since the essence of the People’s War is to develop Support Bases; therefore the Great Plan of Developing Bases has to do with the construction of the new Power and its development, it has to do with the perspective that is being opened for the conquest of Power countrywide. The political strategy is to develop Support Bases and the military strategy is to develop the People’s War serving the world revolution, a plan that is being fulfilled through a pilot plan.

The triumph of the revolution begets and crushes a powerful counterrevolution. Thus, we are entering decisive years in which APRA continues without having a strategic plan; they talk of a “new strategy” but there is no such thing. The only thing they can do is bestow stronger measures, more political, economic, and social laws, strengthening the military to facilitate the armed forces’ fight against us, unleashing a new genocide under new conditions, for us as well as for them. For us, the genocide under way presents itself under new circumstances. We have passed through the genocide of 1983 and 1984 that demonstrated the great popular repudiation and the strengthening of the revolution. Reaction can only apply genocide, but that will fortify the People’s War. There might be initial retreats or inflections, but we shall prevail by persisting in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought, in our politics of the five developments, in the invincibility of the People’s War and in the support of the people who make and shall make history always under the leadership of the Communist Party.

On the concrete situations and possibilities that are presented us in the new Great Plan of Developing Bases we must be aware of:

1) The appearance of armed groups such as the MRTA and the CRP [the short-lived People’s Revolutionary Commando—Trans.] who have been recast, but who do not have a well-defined Marxist conception. Thus, they march to serve imperialism, social-imperialism, and the supposed dialogue with the fascists to whom they have already given unilateral truces.

2) APRA has already begun to unfold fascism and corporativism. It faces serious and increasing difficulties, such as its growing and sinuous collusion and contention with the comprador bourgeoisie, among other even more important contradictions.

3) The class struggle sharpens and intensifies more, the masses begin to defend themselves and resist; given social explosions in the urban areas, they could be used by social-imperialism and the reactionaries in general, through their representatives.

4) A coup d’etat is possible at any moment. García Pérez himself may promote a self-coup in order to preserve his political future.

5) In perspective, the reactionaries can also play with an Allende-type government, using the Aprista Barrantes or someone similar; within this possibility one must consider the sinister role of the United Left.

6) The Peruvian State has border problems that can be inflamed at any moment, as is shown by the experience of other Latin American countries. This problem must be seriously addressed.

7) The sending of Yankee troops is already a real fact and not simply a possibility. Their presence is linked to a similar presence in other countries, especially on the border and it must be seen in the context of military measures taken by Brazil.

8) The imperialist wars and their aggressions continue to increase. The World War for hegemony between the USA and the USSR continues being prepared through collusion and contention on a global scale. Consequently, the People’s War is a peremptory necessity and the world people’s war is an inevitable perspective.All these possibilities must be taken seriously into account to handle the People’s War with politics in command, and particularly with an eye toward the conquest of power countrywide that may present itself and which must be taken up. For these reasons, we must be ideologically, politically and organizationally prepared.

The First Campaign of the Pilot Plan of the Great Plan of Developing Bases has meant the largest shake-up with greater national and international repercussions. The old State is fracturing more and more, which had never been shaken up this way by anyone in Peru. Now it is up to us to fulfil the historical and political necessity of “Finish by brilliantly establishing a historical milestone!” in the Second Campaign, understanding that the Pilot Plan is like the initial battle of the Great Plan of Developing Bases.

In conclusion, after close to eight years of People’s War we have completed more than forty five thousand actions that reveal their high quality; the militarized Party has been tempered; the People’s Guerrilla Army has been developed and has increased its belligerence; and we have hundreds of organizations of the new Power with the poorest masses increasingly in support of us. The People’s War has raised the class struggle of our people to its highest form and that affects the struggle of the masses themselves, impelling them to incorporate themselves by leaps and bounds into the People’s War. Thus, the “People’s War is turning the country upside down, the ‘old mole’ [el topo viejo] is profoundly rooting up the entrails of the old society. No one can stop it, the future already dwells among us, the old and rotten society is sinking irrevocably, the revolution will prevail. Long Live the People’s War!” Our task is to develop the People’s War serving the world revolution under the banners of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought.


Chairman Mao established the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside, with its heart in the Support Bases. He took into account that the powerful imperialists and their reactionary Chinese allies were entrenched in the principal cities, and if the revolution refused to capitulate and wanted to persevere in the struggle it had to convert the backwards rural zones into advanced and solid Support Bases, into great military, political, economic and cultural bulwarks of the revolution to fight against the fierce enemy that was assaulting the rural zones using the cities, and to carry the revolution forward step by step to a complete victory through a protracted war.

Based on this Maoist thesis, Chairman Gonzalo has established the carrying forward of a unified People’s War where the countryside is the principal theater of armed actions: Since in our country we have an immense majority of peasant masses, that is where we must build the Support Bases. As Chairman Mao said: “the protracted revolutionary struggle in the revolutionary base areas consists mainly in peasant guerrilla warfare led by the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, it is wrong to ignore the necessity of using rural districts as revolutionary base areas, to neglect painstaking work among the peasants, and to neglect guerrilla warfare.” [The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party December 1939, S.W. Vol. 2—Trans.] Furthermore, Chairman Gonzalo specifies that in the cities armed actions should be carried forward as a complement, since international experience, as well as our own, demonstrates that this is feasible. He draws lessons, for example, from what happened to the guerrillas in the Philippines which recast themselves in the countryside and left the cities quiet, especially the capital, resulting in the isolation of the guerrillas. In Brazil, the revolutionaries also carried out armed actions in the countryside and city, only they neglected to specify which was principal. In Vietnam, important armed actions were carried out in the cities. Thus, taking into account the peculiarities of the cities in Latin America, where the percentage of the proletariat and of the poor masses in the cities is high, the masses are ready to develop actions complementing those in the countryside. In the cities, however, the New Power or Support Bases are not being built, rather the Front is solidified through the Revolutionary Defense Movement of the People (MRDP) with Resistance Centers that carry out the People’s War and prepare the future insurrection, which will occur when the forces of the countryside assault the cities in combination with the insurrection from within.

The Support Bases are the strategic bases which the guerrilla forces rely on to fulfil their strategic tasks and to achieve the objective of preserving and increasing their forces as well as annihilating and throwing back the enemy. Without such strategic Bases there would be nothing to base ourselves on to carry out any one of our strategic tasks and to reach the war’s objective.

Chairman Mao expounded three reasons for the creation of Support Bases: To have armed forces, to defeat the enemy and to mobilize the masses. These were specified in our People’s War in 1982, by applying the Plan of Deployment of the guerrilla war in the part ‘Strike the enemy’, aiming at destroying the old feudal relations of production. Police posts were assaulted, selective annihilation of feudal landlord power was applied, and the police forces abandoned the countryside and were regrouped in the provincial capitals. The authorities of the old Power massively resigned which created a power vacuum, while tens of thousands were mobilized. It is in these conditions that the Support Bases emerged and were specified in the clandestine People’s Committees. Therefore, it is wrong to take the Chinese experience dogmatically since if the conditions were given and principles were in effect, we would have had sufficient reason to build the Support Bases. To agree upon this implied a struggle against Rightism which argued that we had not defeated large enemy forces, when the problem was that the enemy forces had abandoned the countryside as a consequence of the rout of their political and military plans.

Chairman Gonzalo has established a system of Support Bases surrounded by guerrilla zones, operational zones and points of action taking into account the political and social conditions, the tradition of struggle, the geographical characteristics and the development of the Party, the Army and of the masses.

It is fundamental to support the validity of the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside and its heart, the Support Bases, because with only wandering guerrillas of insurrection the People’s Guerrilla Army would not have the Support Bases as a rearguard that sustains it, nor would the new Power be built. We are totally against foquismo.


The People’s War is protracted because it derives from the correlation between the enemy’s factors and our factors that are determined by the following four fundamental characteristics: The first is that Peru is a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society in which a bureaucratic capitalism is unfolding; the second is that the enemy is strong; the third is that the People’s Guerrilla Army is weak; and the fourth is that the Communist Party leads the People’s War. From the first and fourth characteristics we can derive that the People’s Guerrilla Army will not grow too rapidly and will not defeat its enemy soon. These peculiarities determine the protracted character of the war.

The enemy is strong and we are weak; in that fact resides the danger of our defeat. The enemy has a single advantage—the numerous contingents of its forces and the armaments they rely upon—but every other aspect constitutes their weak points. Their objective is to defend the old and rotten Power of the landlord-bureaucratic State. It has a bourgeois military line; it is a mercenary army. It does not have conscious discipline and its morale is low. It has profound contradictions between officers and soldiers, and it is discredited before the masses. Furthermore, the very foundation of the reactionary army is of worker and peasant origin, which can disintegrate during the course of an unjust war. Apart from this, the Peruvian armed forces have never won a war and they are experts in defeat. Furthermore, they have repeatedly counted on and still count on the support of international reaction, but we count on the support of the oppressed nations, of the peoples of the world and the international proletariat, which are the new forces.

The People’s Guerrilla Army has a single weak point, its insufficient development but the remaining aspects constitute valuable advantages: It carries forward a People’s War to create a new Power; it has a proletarian military line, led absolutely by the Communist Party; it is based on class valor and revolutionary heroism and on a conscious discipline. Its morale is high and there is a close union between officers and soldiers and it is an army composed of the people themselves, mainly poor workers and peasants.

But the objective fact is that there is a large disparity between the forces of the enemy and our forces and for us to go from weak to strong requires a period of time, one in which the defects of the enemy are exposed and our advantages are developed. Therefore, we say that our army appears weak but is strong in essence and the enemy’s army appears strong but is weak in essence. Thus, to go from weak to strong we must carry forward the protracted war and this has three stages: The first is the period of the strategic offensive of the enemy and the strategic defensive of our forces. The second will be the period of the strategic consolidation of the enemy and of our preparation for the counteroffensive. The third will be the period of our strategic counteroffensive and of the strategic withdrawal of the enemy.

Chairman Gonzalo thus teaches us that the People’s War is protracted, long and ruthless but victorious and tells us that the length of its duration will be extended or shortened within its protracted character to the extent that we fight within the proletarian military line, since Rightism is the principal danger that can cause serious setbacks to the war.

Today, we find ourselves in the period of the strategic offensive of the enemy and of our own strategic defensive. We must strengthen the People’s War by applying generalized guerrilla warfare, laying foundations for the next stage, paying whatever cost is necessary but fighting to minimize it.


To unleash the People’s War we must count on the principal form of organization, which is the People’s Guerrilla Army, since the backbone of the old State is the reactionary armed forces and to destroy the old State one must first destroy its reactionary army. The Party must count on a powerful army: “Without a people’s army the people have nothing,” as Chairman Mao taught us.

The construction of the Army is seen in the line of construction based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought. In synthesis, Chairman Gonzalo has made a contribution by incorporating the militia into the People’s Guerrilla Army. Its creation is a step toward the sea of armed masses and the solution of going from disorganized masses to masses who are militarily organized.


Chairman Gonzalo emphasizes seven points on strategy and tactics of Chairman Mao specifying some of them. We must pay close attention to these in order to lead the People’s War.

1. On Strategy and Tactics. He starts from Chairman Mao’s thesis that the task of strategy as a science is to study the laws of leading military operations that influence the situation of the war as a whole. The task of the science of campaigns and tactics is to study the laws of leading military operations of a partial character. He makes a strategic development of how to wage the war in the country as a whole and in each zone, taking into account its links to the international situation. He established for us the axes, sub-axes, directions of movement and lines of movements which permit us to maintain the strategic course of the war under any circumstances and to face all types of political and military operations that the counterrevolution launches. On this basis he established the National Military Plan that is strategically centralized and tactically decentralized, starting from the premise that all plans are ideological, that they must reflect both reality and the rugged paths which this reality will express. Taking up Stalin, he links strategy with tactics and establishes the strategic-operational Plans that are the concrete way that strategy is linked to tactical operations. As a result, each Committee must elaborate its strategic-operational plans within the strategic-operational Plan common to the entire Party.

The correct disposition emanates from the just decision of the commander; based on the indispensable recognition and careful study of the situation of the enemy, our situation and the interrelationship of both. That is, we must always keep in mind “the two hills”; we must be guided by a political strategy and by a military strategy.

For the elaboration of the Plans always take into account the following general features: 1) The international class struggle between revolution and counterrevolution; ideology; the international communist movement; the RIM. 2) The class struggle in the country; the counterrevolution; the political juncture; and the counter-subversive war. 3) The development of the People’s War; its balance; laws and lessons. 4) The need for investigation. 5) The People’s War and construction. 6) The People’s War and the masses. 7) The two-line struggle. 8) Programming and Chronology. 9) Attitude and slogans. “Rise above the difficulties and conquer greater victories!”

In almost eight years of the People’s War, we have had four plans: Plan of Initiation; Plan of Deploying the People’s War; Plan of Conquering Bases; and, Plan of Developing Bases.

2. The basic principle of war. All the orienting principles of military operations originate with a single basic principle: Do everything possible to preserve our own forces and to annihilate the enemy’s forces. All war imposes a price, sometimes it is extremely high. To conserve our own forces, we must annihilate those of the enemy; but to annihilate the enemy, we must pay a price in order to preserve the whole. Chairman Gonzalo teaches us that one must be prepared to pay the highest cost of the war, but we should fight so that it will always be the smallest possible cost. It is a contradiction and the problem resides in attitude and good planning; it is mainly a question of leadership. He forged us in the “challenge to death”, in “revolutionary heroism” and in “conquer laurels in death.” In war we always see the two aspects, the destructive and the constructive and the principal aspect is the second one.

3. Guerrilla tactics or basic tactics. “The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.” This basic tactic must be embodied and applied, maneuvering around the enemy and seeking his weak point to smash it.

4. Campaigns of “encirclement and annihilation” and the counter-campaigns, the principal form of the People’s War. It is a law that the counterrevolution, in order to crush the revolution unleashes campaigns of “encirclement and annihilation” against each unit of the People’s Guerrilla Army or against the Support Bases. The operations of the People’s Guerrilla Army adopt the form of counter-campaigns and Chairman Mao has established nine steps to crush a campaign of “encirclement and annihilation”: 1) the active defense; 2) the preparation of a counter-campaign; 3) the strategic withdrawal; 4) the strategic counteroffensive; 5) the initiation of the counteroffensive; 6) the concentration of forces; 7) mobile warfare; 8) the war of quick decision; and, 9) the war of annihilation. Chairman Gonzalo, applying this law to the conditions of our People’s War, has outlined the five parts of the campaign which permit us to defeat the political and military plans of the reactionaries. Each campaign has a specific political and military objective, fulfilled by the element of surprise, attacking them when we want, where we want and as we want. He also specified the five steps that must follow each military action always serving the political objective, opposing the criteria of action for action’s sake. He stresses the importance of differentiating between the essence and the appearance of the enemy’s movements. He has also established for us the four forms of struggle of the People’s War: 1) guerrilla action with its two forms, assaults and ambushes; 2) sabotage; 3) selective annihilation; and 4) Propaganda and armed agitation, as well as its diverse methods.

5. The strategic role of guerrilla warfare. Chairman Mao has raised guerrilla warfare to a strategic level. Prior to him, it was only considered as a tactical question that by itself did not decide the outcome of the war; but even though the guerrilla war does not decide the war’s outcome because this requires conventional warfare, it fulfils a series of strategic tasks that carry forward to the favorable outcome of the war. We conceive of guerrilla war on a vast scale, a generalized guerrilla warfare that must support the protracted and bloody war. From there, we apply the six strategic problems of guerrilla warfare: 1) Initiative, flexibility and planning in the realization of offensive operations within the defensive war, battles of rapid decision within the protracted war and operations in the exterior lines within the war in the interior lines. 2) Coordination with the regular warfare. 3) Creation of Support Bases. 4) Strategic defense and strategic assault in the guerrilla war. 5) Transformation of the guerrilla war into mobile warfare. 6) Relationships of command.

6. The ten military principles. In December 1947 Chairman Mao masterfully synthesized the just and correct strategic line followed in more than 20 years of people’s war in 10 military principles. This is seen in his article: “The current situation and our tasks,” third part. We apply these principles and it is very important to broaden their application.

7. Brilliant summary of strategy and tactics. Chairman Mao has summarized in a brilliant way the strategy and the tactics of people’s war in the following phrase: “You fight your way and we’ll fight ours: We fight when we can win and we retreat when we cannot.”

“In other words, you are supported by modern armament and we by the popular masses with a high level of revolutionary conscience; you fight to the fullest with your superiority, and we fight with ours. You have your combat methods and we have ours. When you want to assault us, you are not permitted to do so and cannot even find us. But when we attack you, we reach the target, we inflict accurate, sure blows and we annihilate it. When we can annihilate it, we do so with deliberate decision; when we can not annihilate it, neither do we allow ourselves to be annihilated by you. To not fight when there is a possibility of winning is opportunism. To persist in fighting when there is no possibility of winning is adventurism. All our strategic orientation and tactics are based on our will to fight. Our recognition of the need for retreating is based first of all on our recognition of the need for fighting. When we retreat, we always do so with an eye to future combat so that we may finally and thoroughly annihilate the enemy. Only by supporting ourselves in the broad popular masses can we bring about these strategies and tactics. And in applying them, we can put into full play the superiority of people’s war and constrain the enemy to the passive position of being beaten, although they are superior in equipment and no matter what means they employ. We always preserve the initiative in our hands.” From “Long Live the victory of the People’s War!”, September 1965.

The application of this principle allows us to demonstrate the invincibility of the superior strategy of people’s war, because the proletariat as the last class in history has created its own superior form of war and no other class, including the bourgeoisie with its greatest political and military strategists, are capable of defeating it. The reactionaries dream about elaborating “superior strategies” to people’s war, but are condemned to failure since they are against history. Our People’s War after nearly eight years blazes victoriously, demonstrating the invincibility of people’s war.

The militants of the Communist Party of Peru assume completely and thoroughly the military line of the Party, established by Chairman Gonzalo, that based on the highest creation of the international proletariat, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, has specified our military line with Gonzalo Thought, endowing us with an invincible weapon, the unified People’s War principally in the countryside together with the city as a complement. As the principal form of struggle we carry it forward, it is a bright torch before the world, proclaiming the universal validity of the forever living Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.



Central Committee
Communist Party of Peru

1. Predominant cultural group in the region of Ayacucho and Apurímac.

2. A cacique was a chief of the indias in the area of Cusco, appointed by the Viceroy.

3. Autsparia, Uscho Pedro, and Llaccolla were leaders of rebellions in southern Peru.

4. Andres A. Caceres organized a strong guerrilla movement against the invaders.